Financial Fragility in the Great Moderation by Bezemer, Dirk & Grydaki, Maria
Accepted Manuscript
Financial Fragility in the Great Moderation
Dirk Bezemer, Maria Grydaki
PII: S0378-4266(14)00305-7
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.09.005
Reference: JBF 4558
To appear in: Journal of Banking & Finance
Received Date: 22 March 2014
Accepted Date: 12 September 2014
Please cite this article as: Bezemer, D., Grydaki, M., Financial Fragility in the Great Moderation, Journal of Banking
& Finance (2014), doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.09.005
This is a PDF file of an unedited manuscript that has been accepted for publication. As a service to our customers
we are providing this early version of the manuscript. The manuscript will undergo copyediting, typesetting, and
review of the resulting proof before it is published in its final form. Please note that during the production process
errors may be discovered which could affect the content, and all legal disclaimers that apply to the journal pertain.
  
1 
 
Financial Fragility in the Great Moderation 
 
Dirk Bezemer1∗ and Maria Grydaki2 
 
1Faculty of Economics and Business, University of Groningen, The Netherlands  
2Division of Economics, University of Stirling, United Kingdom  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
A nascent literature explores the measurement of financial fragility. This paper considers 
evidence for rising financial fragility during the 1984-2007 Great Moderation in the U.S. The 
literature suggests that macroeconomic stability combined with strong growth of credit to asset 
markets, in asset prices and in credit relative to output are all indicators of rising financial 
fragility. We show each of these trends in the Great Moderation. We derive the testable 
implication that in the Great Moderation credit growth is driven more by past credit growth and 
less by output growth (Allen and Gale, 2000), relative to pre-Great Moderation years. Results 
from a VAR model estimated on quarterly data for 1955-2007 are consistent with the hypothesis. 
This invites a reinterpretation of the Great Moderation. Our methodology may help understand 
when a credit boom turns into a credit bubble, and contributes to the development of methods of 
measuring financial fragility. 
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Financial Fragility in the Great Moderation 
 
1. Introduction 
  
How does the relation between credit growth and output growth change during a credit boom? 
Which of these changes are likely to turn credit booms into credit bubbles? Understanding the 
changes during the boom may help us better understand if and how credit booms precipitate 
credit crises. In the present paper we focus on this question in an empirical study of the US credit 
boom that preceded the 2008 crash.  
We build on the financial fragility literature which suggests that macroeconomic stability 
combined with strong growth of credit to asset markets, of asset prices and of credit relative to 
output, are all indicators of rising financial fragility. We show each of these trends for the 1984-
2007 Great Moderation in the U.S. We select a testable implication of rising financial fragility, 
which is that credit growth becomes driven more by past credit growth and less by output growth 
(Allen and Gale, 2000). We present evidence that during the Great Moderation, this was true for 
credit towards the financial and real estate sectors, compared to the pre-Great Moderation years. 
Results from a VAR model estimated on quarterly data for 1955-2007 are consistent with our 
hypothesis. This invites a reinterpretation of the Great Moderation and may help understand 
when a credit boom turns into a credit bubble. 
Credit growth leads to output growth (Schumpeter, 1934; King and Levine, 1993; Levine, 
2005), but may simultaneously lead to imbalances and crisis. The first effect has been intensively 
researched, but the conditions for the second effect are not yet well understood. Classical credit 
cycle theories (Wicksell, 1898; Veblen, 1904; Fisher, 1933; Minsky, 1964, 1986) applied and 
extended in contemporary work (Allen and Gale, 2000; Keen, 1995, 2013; Borio, 2012) describe 
how the function of credit in the economy changes over the course of a credit boom and in the 
run up to a bust. The use of credit shifts from financing low-risk, low-return investment in fixed 
capital accumulation and productivity improvements, towards financing high-risk, high-return 
investments in real estate and financial assets and instruments, with increasing leverage and 
financial fragility. The distribution of the credit stock shifts away from the nonfinancial sectors 
and towards the financial and real estate sectors (Beck et al., 20102a). In the process, the link 
between credit dynamics and output growth becomes looser. At the end of a speculative boom, 
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credit growth and rising asset prices are reinforcing each other, so that credit growth is no longer 
mainly driven by economic fundamentals, but more by its own past dynamics (Allen and Gale, 
2000). 
Another feature of the run-up to a boom is that ‘stability is destabilizing’, as Minsky (1978) 
wrote. Low volatility in real and financial variables encourages more debt-financed investment 
and risk taking (Bean, 2011). Greater-than-usual stability is so both caused by more generous 
credit conditions, and encourages financial innovation and further expansion of credit and 
leverage. Leverage, in turn, increases financial fragility, measured as vulnerability to asset prices 
changes (Sutherland et al., 2012). Financial innovations also increase financial fragility (Beck et 
al., 2012b; Gennaioli et al., 2013). 
The US economy during the credit boom that preceded the 2007 Great Crash conformed to 
each of these features. The ‘Great Moderation’ years 1984-2007 saw both unusual 
macroeconomic stability1, financial innovation and expansion of credit, and a shift in the 
distribution of credit towards the financial and real estate sectors. This is evidenced in macro-
level US credit data (shown below). Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) use micro evidence to show the 
rise of leverage ratios of US investment banks and financial firms, but not of US non-financial 
firms. All this suggest that the financial fragility of the US economy was increasing during the 
credit boom which characterized the Great Moderation years.2 Therefore this episode may offer 
an opportunity to study the conditions which distinguish sustainable credit growth from fragility-
increasing credit growth. 
Financial fragility cannot be directly observed, but based on the literature we develop three 
testable hypotheses. We consider Granger causation between credit aggregates and output 
growth when financial fragility is increasing. Although this is no proof of “true” causality, it is 
evidence that “[t]he cause contains information about the effect that that is unique, and is in no 
                                                           
1
 See e.g. Bernanke (2004). Blanchard and Simon (2001) showed that the standard deviation of quarterly growth and 
inflation in the U.S. declined by half and by two thirds, respectively, since 1984. Stock and Watson (2002), Kim and 
Nelson (1999) and Warnock and Warnock (2000) also found this, with strongly declining employment volatility. 
See Cecchetti et al. (2006) for cross country evidence.  
2
 Note that in this paper we do not explain Great Moderation itself. Our argument is different from, but compatible 
with, a wide range of explanations for the Great Moderation in the literature. This includes  labour market changes 
(Jaimovich and Siu, 2009), oil shocks and responses to shocks (Nakov and Pescatori, 2010, Gambetti et al., 2008), 
inventory management (McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 2000; Kahn et al., 2002; McCarthy and Zakrajsek, 2007), 
external balances (Fogli and Perri, 2006), better monetary policies (Bernanke, 2004) and ‘good luck’ (Ahmed et al., 
2002; Cogley and Sargent, 2005; Primiceri, 2005; Sims and Zha, 2006; Gambetti et al., 2008; Benati and Surico, 
2009). 
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other variable” (Granger, 2003).3 The hypotheses are (i) a weakening of Granger causation from 
output growth to growth in credit to the nonfinancial sectors, (ii) a weakening of Granger 
causation from both output growth and growth in credit to nonfinancial business to growth in 
credit to the real estate and financial markets, and (iii) stronger Granger causation of growth in 
credit to real estate and financial markets to its own future growth. 
We test these hypotheses in a VAR framework on quarterly U.S. data during the Great 
Moderation (1984-2008) and before the Great Moderation (1955-1979) (where nothing depends 
on the precise choice of break dates), controlling for inflation and for the stance of monetary 
policy. We conduct Granger causation tests, impulse response functions and forecast error 
variance decompositions to probe our hypotheses. Among other findings, we observe that during 
the Great Moderation, output growth ceases to Granger-cause growth in credit to the 
nonfinancial sectors. We also find that the percentage of forecast error variance of credit to real 
estate and financial markets explained by its own past growth rises from 27.5 % before the Great 
Moderation to 85.1% during the Great Moderation. We tentatively suggest that these and other 
changes in the relation of credit and output can be interpreted as indication of increasing 
financial fragility.  
We make two contributions. First, despite strongly increased research interest in financial 
fragility, the concept remains elusive and its measurement difficult. We suggest a translation of 
key notions in the fragility literature into empirically observable trends. We make no strong 
claims about the finality of our definitions, but we believe that approaching financial fragility as 
a change in the relations between variables (credit growth, output growth, volatility) rather than 
as some variables may prove fruitful in the developing financial fragility research agenda. 
Second, we link empirically the stability of the U.S. Great Moderation period to the changing 
relations between credit and output in the U.S. Thus, our contribution is not so much in the 
technical methods (which are conventional) as in suggesting measures of developing financial 
fragility. 
In the next section we present and discuss the stylized facts of credit and growth in the U.S. 
from the early 1950s to 2008. We motivate the functional differentiation of two credit 
                                                           
3
 In his Nobel acceptance speech, Granger (2003) continued to say that “[a]t that time, I had little idea that so many 
people had very fixed ideas about causation, but they did agree that my definition was not “true causation” in their 
eyes, it was only “Granger causation”. I would ask for a definition of true causation, but no one would reply.” 
(Granger, 2003:366). 
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aggregates. In section 3 we present the methodology, the data and the analysis. Section 4 
concludes with a discussion of limitations and possible extensions.  
 
2. The Functional Differentiation of Credit: Trends in the U.S. 
 
To understand the build-up of fragility, we should “distinguish between different categories of 
credit, which perform different economic functions“, as Turner et al. (2010:16) urge. We 
therefore propose a functional differentiation of credit.  
The deepening of markets for financial intermediation, often measured as an increase in the 
ratio of bank credit to GDP, has long been viewed as a key driver of growth in output.4 However, 
a string of recent papers shows that a high value of this ratio may slow down growth (Rousseau 
and Wachtel, 2011; Arcand et al., 2012; Cecchetti and Kharroubi, 2012), while high growth of 
the credit-to-GDP ratio increases financial fragility, carrying the risk of crisis (Reinhart and 
Rogoff, 2009; Schularick and Taylor, 2012; Jorda et al., 2011). Financial fragility is defined as 
sensitivity of default rates to income or asset price shocks (Jappelli et al., 2008), increasing the 
probability of financial instability (Minsky, 1978). 
In particular, growth of credit other than to nonfinancial firms – such as household mortgage 
credit or credit to financial firms - has been linked with increasing financial fragility (Jappelli et 
al., 2008; Barba and Pivetti, 2009; Büyükkarabacak and Valev, 2010). Allen and Gale (2000) 
show theoretically how, by simultaneously driving up asset prices and leverage in a mutually 
enforcing process, such financing may increase financial fragility. Borio and Lowe (2004) find 
empirically that high credit growth coupled with an asset price boom is a good predictor of 
financial fragility and instability. Bernoth and Pick (2011) demonstrate that linkages between 
banks and insurance companies are important when forecasting financial fragility. Each of these 
findings suggest a special role for credit supporting price rises in (real estate and other) assets, 
distinct from credit to nonfinancial firms, supporting the production of goods and services. 
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2012) link the rise in their measure of financial fragility in the US in the 
2000s to increasing leverage in households and in nonbank financial firms, but not in non-
financial firms. 
                                                           
4
 The empirical literature started with King and Levine’s (1993) seminal Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be 
Right which builds on Schumpeter (1934, 1939), Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973). Levine 
(2005) and Ang (2008) provide overviews. Beck et al. (2009) present recent empirical results. 
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This suggests that bank credit to markets for real estate, stock, bonds and other financial 
assets and instruments -  jointly labelled the ‘finance, insurance and real estate’ sectors, or 
‘FIRE’ sectors in the U.S. National Product and Income Accounts – may deserve special 
attention. The literature indicates that especially debt-financed returns may increase financial 
fragility. Grydaki and Bezemer (2013) show that growth in credit supporting wealth formation 
helps explain reduced output growth volatility. Kemme and Roy (2012) find that the U.S. 
mortgage credit boom, which was instrumental in increasing housing wealth, was a predictor of 
the 2007 crisis. In this paper we are, therefore, especially interested in changes in the credit-
growth relations before the crisis, for separate credit aggregates. We constructed time series over 
the period 1951-2007 for credit to the nonfinancial sector and FIRE-sector credit, based on flow 
of funds data. 
We observe that the U.S. credit boom, since the 1980s until the 2008 crisis, was 
overwhelmingly due to credit to the ‘FIRE’ sectors, not to the nonfinancial sectors. Figure 1 
illustrates this. The GDP ratio of credit to the nonfinancial sectors was roughly stable between 
80% and 110% over the six decades 1951-2007, with most of the increase due to an upward shift 
in the mid 1980s. But credit to the FIRE sectors rose from less than one third of GDP in the early 
1950s to more than twice the GDP level in 2007, with most of that growth occurring during the 
Great Moderation. In 1984, the GDP ratio of the volume of FIRE-sector credit instruments was 
still below 100%. After that until the 2008 crash, it was growing at 4.6% annually on average, 
compared to only 1.1% for the GDP ratio of nonfinancial sector credit. 
 
[Figure 1 HERE] 
 
The Great Moderation years were not only credit boom years, but as its name implies, also years 
of macroeconomic tranquillity. Minsky (1978) identified unusual stability as another feature of a 
destabilizing credit boom. With more stability, agents are encouraged to take more risk, leading 
to bubbles and busts (Allen and Gale, 2000). Bean (2011) discusses how during the Great 
Moderation, low volatility in real and financial variables induced more debt-financed investment 
and risk taking. For all these reasons – the upward shift in credit-to-GDP ratios; the shift in credit 
growth from the nonfinancial to the FIRE sector; and the onset of stability ending in severe 
instability – we study the ‘Great Moderation’ years 1984-2007, in contrast to the preceding 
decades, as a ‘credit boom gone bust’ (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). We know there was a credit 
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boom (Figure 1) and we know this was followed by a ‘bust’. In this paper we ask how we may 
observe whether financial fragility increased during the boom. 
The challenge we address is how to distinguish a credit boom leading to a bust from one that 
is part of the normal financial deepening process. The approach we take is not so much to ask 
‘what drives GDP?’ (as in the credit-growth literature; Uhlig, 2004) as ‘what drives credit?’. The 
question we ask is: ‘How are the relations of credit aggregates with growth and with each other 
different in a sustainable growth episode, compared to credit growth with increasing financial 
fragility?’ We quantify the strength of relation in terms of Granger causation. It bears repetition 
that this is not equal to substantive causality, but it is a measure of how common sequences of 
changes of different variables are in a given time series. We exploit the fact that we know that 
the U.S. credit boom since the mid-1980s did lead to a credit crisis (Kemme and Roy, 2012) and 
suggest three testable hypotheses. 
First, if nonfinancial sector credit is allocated such that it increases economic efficiency, it is 
allocated in response to observed growth opportunities (an assumption also exploited in the 
literature on international financial flows and growth; Prasad et al., 2007; Rodrik and 
Subramanian, 2009). By implication, over time we expect nonfinancial sector credit growth to 
increase following increases in GDP growth. Conversely, if the build-up of financial fragility is 
due to the misallocation of credit, then we expect to see a weakening of this Granger causation 
between output and nonfinancial-sector credit. 
Second, the sequence in a sustainable growth process is that nonfinancial sector credit by 
banks or markets which leads to growth, allows for investments in wealth (real estate, stocks and 
bonds), and the credit flows that finance these investments (such as mortgages). In this process, 
we should observe changes in FIRE-sector credit growth following nonfinancial-sector credit 
growth and GDP growth. If, on the contrary, financial fragility is building, this implies self-
propelled growth in asset markets where capital gains induce more borrowing, with little relation 
to investment and growth in the nonfinancial sectors. In this case, we expect to see a weakening 
of Granger causation from both GDP growth and nonfinancial-sector credit growth to FIRE-
sector credit growth. Our testable hypotheses, then, are that we observe during the Great 
Moderation relative to earlier years: (i) a weakening of Granger causation from output growth to 
growth in credit to the nonfinancial sectors, (ii) a weakening of Granger causation from both 
output growth and growth in credit to the nonfinancial sectors to growth in credit to the FIRE 
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sectors, and (iii) stronger Granger causation in growth in credit to real estate and financial 
markets to its own future growth.5  
 
3.  Methodology, Data and Analysis 
 
We estimate a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model (Sims, 1980), which allows analysis of 
interdependencies between time series. Since we have no priors on exogeneity or the direction of 
causation, all variables are treated as endogenous. Each variable may depend on its own lags and 
on the lags of other variables. The structure of the model is: 
 
         0 1 1 ...− −= Α + Α + + Α +t t p t p ty y y ε                                                                                         (1) 
 
where yt is a (n x 1) vector with each of the n endogenous variables, A0 a (n x 1) vector of 
intercept terms, Ai  reflects (n x n) matrices of coefficients with i=1,…p, and εt denotes a (n x 1) 
vector of error terms. The variables included in the model are the annual growth rates of the 
logarithm (i) of real GDP (RGDP), (ii) of the real value of the stock of credit instruments in the 
nonfinancial sectors (RCR), and (iii) of the real value of the stock of credit instrument in the 
FIRE sectors (RCF). This includes both credit by deposit taking institutions (banks) and other 
financial institutions, which hold both (securitized) bank loans and other credit assets. Data were 
obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.6 
                                                           
5
 Note that we do not have a hypothesis on the causal relation from nonfinancial-sector credit growth to output 
growth. Because credit to the nonfinancial sectors is used by nonfinancial firms and households for nonfinancial 
transactions, this is bound to increase GDP over all stages of a credit cycle. We expect to find Granger causation 
from nonfinancial sector credit to output growth both before and during the Great Moderation, but this is not a 
hypothesis that helps us distinguish between sustainable growth and increasing financial fragility. A second point of 
note is that we also do not hypothesize that credit to the FIRE sector normally causes output growth, but that this 
causal link weakens during a bubble. FIRE-sector credit consists of loans to support investment in assets, not in 
goods and services, so there is no reason to expect a direct causal relation to transactions in goods and services, as 
measured by GDP. At best, debt-financed investment in bonds and stocks may facilitate investment in the 
nonfinancial sectors, which in turn causes growth. In that sense FIRE-sector credit flows are secondary to the growth 
process. Beck et al. (2012a) show in cross-country regressions that mortgages - the larger part of their household 
credit measure - indeed has no effect on output growth. 
6
 We utilize quarterly data from ‘Z’ tables in the Flow of Funds Accounts. We construct the stock of credit 
instruments in the nonfinancial sectors as follows. We take series FL384004005.Q, titled ‘domestic nonfinancial 
sectors credit market instruments’ and subtract mortgage credit (series FL383165005.Q, ‘domestic nonfinancial 
sectors; total mortgages). We correct for inter-firm trade credit (FL383070005.Q; see Mateut et al., 2006 on the role 
of trade credit), firm-to-customer consumer credit (FL383066005.Q) and ‘other loans and advances’ 
(FL383069005.Q). Finally, we subtract net financial investment (including home equity withdrawal; Greenspan and 
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We also include two control variables: the annual growth rate of the logarithm of the 
(overnight) federal funds rate (FR), and inflation (INF) measured by the real GDP deflator, both 
provided by the St. Louis Fed website. We use quarterly data over two subsamples, 1955Q3-
1979Q4 (before the Great Moderation) and 1984Q1-2008Q1 (during the Great Moderation). We 
follow the convention in the Great Moderation literature, where 1984 is often adopted as the start 
of the Great Moderation (among others Kim and Nelson, 1999; McConnell and Perez-Quiros, 
2000; Kahn et al., 2002; Stock and Watson, 2002), though other years in the early 1980s are also 
used.7 We also did an extensive break point robustness analysis by letting the data select break 
points independently of the Great Moderation dating. This did not change the findings reported 
below, so that we are confident our results are not driven by the choice of break points.8  
All three endogenous variables, the annual growth rates of RGDP, RCR, RCF, are found to 
be stationary at their level (I(0)), but the control variables, the annual growth rate of FR and INF 
are detected to be stationary when taking their first difference (I(1)) in both subsamples.9 Table 1 
reports descriptive statistics for the variables (absolute mean, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis) for the two subsamples. 
 
[Table 1 HERE] 
 
The growth of all variables is positive before the Great Moderation and all variables are more 
volatile before the Great Moderation than during the Great Moderation, apart from the growth 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Kennedy, 2008). We construct FIRE sector credit by adding mortgage credit held in the nonfinancial sector (series 
FL383165005.Q) to domestic financial sector credit market instruments. 
7
 Our choice of samples ensures that the first sample is before the Great Moderation, and the second sample is 
during the Great Moderation. We applied the Chow test for structural breaks over the whole period 1955Q3-2008Q1 
and find that any other quarter during 1980Q1-1983Q4 is also a potential breakpoint in output volatility. We also ran 
robustness analyses to ensure that our findings are not sensitive to using another quarter as the start of the Great 
Moderation. 
8
 We checked for multiple unknown breaks in the credit data during the entire sample using the Bai-Perron 
procedure. Four breaks were detected (1967Q2, 1975Q1, 1990Q4 and 1998Q2); in addition, there are multiple break 
points in the output growth series: 1967Q2, 1975Q1, 1982Q3 (the Great Moderation start), 1990Q4, 1998Q2 and 
1999Q4. We then conducted the analysis using these break points. The results in and before the Great Moderation 
are consistent with the results reported in this paper, which adopts break point consistent with the dating of the Great 
Moderation in the literature. That is, our results are not driven by the choice of break points. 
9
 We apply the following stationarity tests to the logs of the variables: (i) Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin 
(KPSS) (Kwiatkowski et al., 1992), (ii) Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) (Dickey and Fuller, 1979) and (iii) Phillips 
and Perron (PP) (Phillips and Perron, 1988). For tests (i) and (iii), the lag length was selected by the kernel-based 
estimator of the frequency zero spectrum, which is based on a weighted sum of the covariances. For test (ii) the 
selection of the number of lags in the test equations is according to the Schwartz Information Criterion (SIC). The 
stationarity is tested at 1%, 5%, 10% significance levels and the time trend has not been taken into account in the 
test equation. The unit root test results are available on request. 
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rate of RCR. The distribution of annual growth rates of real output, real credit to nonfinancial 
sectors and real credit to financial and real estate sectors all exhibit positive skewness with few 
high values in the first subsample; the opposite holds for the remaining variables. Furthermore, 
the kurtosis (or “peakedness”) statistics for the distributions of almost all the variables show 
more deviations from the normal distribution in the first subsample than in the second, apart 
from the annual growth rate of funds rate for which the inverse case holds.  
We estimate a number of reduced-form VAR models for two subsamples using quarterly 
data, 1955Q3-1979Q4 (before the Great Moderation) and 1984Q1-2008Q1 (during the Great 
Moderation) where nothing depends on the choice of the break point. We examine whether lags 
of the annual growth of RCR, RCF and RGDP Granger-cause these or other variables. We 
estimate VAR(p) models with p=1,…12 and the model selection criterion is the minimum value 
of SIC. This procedure yields VAR(2) and VAR(1) models for the first and second subsamples, 
respectively.10  
After estimating the model, we explore the relationships between the variables in three 
ways. First, we run Grange causality tests, where a series xt is said to Granger-cause a series yt if 
changes in xt precede changes in yt so that xt improves predictions of yt, but yt does not improve 
predictions of xt (Granger, 1969). Second, we compute impulse response functions (IRFs) which 
quantify the effect of a one standard deviation shock to innovations in the error terms of one 
variable on current and future values of it and all other variables. An IRF graph so displays the 
response of any variable over time to a shock in its own or other error terms. Sims (1980) 
suggests that examining IRFs might be the most effective way to observe the presence (or 
otherwise) of Granger causation in multivariate frameworks. A third way of characterizing the 
dynamic behavior of the VAR is to conduct a forecast error variance decomposition analysis, as 
suggested also by Sims (1980).  
 
[Table 2 HERE] 
 
Granger causation tests are reported in Table 2. We detect, first, bidirectional Granger causation 
from the growth of RCR (GLRCR) to growth of RGDP (GLRGDP) and vice versa in the first 
                                                           
10
 Although the lag order of the VAR is too short, the dynamic behavior of the variables can be captured sufficiently 
in the first subsample. We tried also VAR(5) and VAR(11) for the first and second subsample, respectively, 
indicated by Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the results do not change substantially. 
  
11 
 
subsample, but unidirectional Granger causation from GLRCR to GLRGDP in the second 
subsample. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that the build-up of financial fragility 
during the Great Moderation was due to the misallocation of credit, indicated by weaker Granger 
causation from GLRGDP to GLRCR. Second, both GLRCR and GLRGDP Granger-caused the 
growth of RCF (GLRCF) before the Great Moderation. The Granger causation from GLRCR to 
GLRCF is still significant in the Great Moderation, though with much lower values for the test 
statistic, implying the gradual weakening of Granger causation from GLRCR to GLRCF. This is 
consistent with the second hypothesis. Moreover, both the impulse response function (IRF) 
graphs and the forecast error variance decomposition show greater responsiveness of credit to its 
own lags in the Great Moderation (something we cannot test in a Granger causation framework). 
 
[Figure 2 HERE] 
 
Figure 2 show results from IRF analyses over 12 periods for the two subsamples. The IRF graphs 
are all consistent with the Granger causation tests before the Great Moderation, but not during 
the Great Moderation. GLRGDP responds positively to a one-standard deviation shock in the 
growth of GLRCR both before and during the Great Moderation. We also observe a reverse 
response, of GLRCR to a one-standard deviation shock in GLRGDP after three quarters before 
the Great Moderation. This reverse response is absent during the Great Moderation, in line with 
our first hypothesis. 
Further, GLRCF responds positively to a one-standard deviation shock in the growth of 
GLRCR before, but not during the Great Moderation, in line with hypothesis 2. The response of 
GLRCF to GLRCR during the Great Moderation is positive and significant only in the first 
quarter, and insignificant in the other 11 quarters. This stands in contrast to the response of 
GLRCF to GLRCR before the Great Moderation period, when it was positive and significant 
during the whole period. So we do indeed find a weakening of Granger causation from growth in 
credit to the nonfinancial sectors to growth in credit to the FIRE sectors, as in hypothesis 2.  
We also note that during the Great Moderation, FIRE-sector credit growth appears much 
more self-propelled during the Great Moderation than before, in line with hypothesis 3. GLRCF 
responds more strongly and with longer duration to a one-standard deviation shock in its own 
growth during the Great Moderation. 
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Finally, also forecast error variance decomposition analysis supports the observations from 
Granger causation tests (Table 3).We computed the 12-quarters-ahead forecast error variance 
decompositions. The percentage of forecast error variance of nonfinancial sector credit growth 
explained by real output growth was 11.5% before the Great Moderation but only 0.3 % during 
the Great Moderation, in line with our first hypothesis. Second, the percentage of forecast error 
variance of FIRE-sector credit growth explained by nonfinancial sector credit growth was 66.8 % 
before the Great Moderation, falling to 14.7% during the Great Moderation, in line with our 
second hypothesis. The percentage caused by GDP growth goes down from 5.7% to 0.3%. In this 
sense, FIRE-sector credit indeed decoupled from output and especially from the credit flows that 
finance output. Finally, the percentage of the forecast error variance of FIRE-sector credit 
growth explained by its own past growth was 27.5% before the Great Moderation, but rising to a 
remarkable 85.1% during the Great Moderation. FIRE sector credit became mainly driven by 
itself, by this evidence.  
  
[Table 3 HERE] 
 
4. Summary, Conclusions and Policy Implications 
 
The U.S. during the 1984-2007 Great Moderation saw unusual macroeconomic stability 
combined with strong growth in asset prices and in credit relative to output, with a shift in the 
distribution of credit towards the financial and real estate sectors. We discuss the literature which 
shows that each of these trends is associated with increasing financial fragility, suggesting that 
the Great Moderation stability was destabilizing. We develop testable implications by exploiting 
the implication that with increasing financial fragility, credit growth is driven more by past credit 
growth and less by output growth. This is especially relevant to credit towards the financial and 
real estate sectors. 
Based on flow of funds data, we construct time series of credit to the nonfinancial sectors 
and credit to the financial and real estate sectors. In the analysis, we distinguish between these 
different credit aggregates and their roles in generating financial fragility. We explore the 
changing relations between credit aggregates and growth in terms of Granger causation in the 
context of a VAR model. Different from substantive causality, Granger causation is a measure 
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for how common sequences of changes of different variables are in a given time series. This fits 
the definition of financial fragility which we employ. 
Results from VAR estimations on quarterly data before the Great Moderation show bi-
directional Granger causation between output and credit to the nonfinancial sectors and 
unidirectional Granger causation from credit to asset markets to credit to the nonfinancial 
sectors. During the Great Moderation until the 2008 crash, Granger causation from output to 
credit to the nonfinancial sectors is no longer observable. Changes in credit to asset markets are 
Granger caused by own past changes more than by any other variable in the system, which was 
not the case before the Great Moderation. These results are consistent with the hypotheses. The 
changes in the relations of credit and output invite a reinterpretation of the Great Moderation. 
We present these results as tentative evidence that it is possible to empirically distinguish 
between two scenarios. One is where credit growth supports output growth in a sustainable 
manner. Financial deepening does not increase financial fragility and does not increase the 
likelihood of finance-induced instability. The other scenario is where financial deepening, even 
while it supports growth in output, renders the economy more vulnerable to shocks, or is 
building up the likelihood of shocks produced by the financial sector itself. This distinction has 
been spelled out in the theoretical literature, but there is yet no consensus on the empirical 
measurement of financial fragility. We offer this analysis as a contribution towards that goal. 
Perhaps financial fragility can fruitfully be conceptualized as a change in the relations between 
macro variables, rather than as a variable itself. 
There are two broad policy implications. The first is that monitoring and, perhaps, regulation 
of credit and asset markets should be part of macroprudential policy. Even if asset prices are not 
a target for monetary policy in the way consumer prices are, asset prices and the credit flows that 
support asset markets are apparently informative on financial fragility, and should therefore be 
subject to macroprudential policies. This is especially true for real estate asset markets, as one us 
argues in detail elsewhere (Bezemer, 2014). Researchers at the Bank for International 
Settlements have been calling attention to the role of asset markets for financial stability for 
many years, even before the crisis (Borio and Lowe 2002). Increasing recognition of these 
relations should now be translated into policy frameworks. 
Second and relatedly, macroeconomic analysis for policy purposes should include indicators 
of financial fragility, beyond conventional real-sector indicators such as inflation, 
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unemployment, growth, inventories and external balances. It was the use of financial-sector and 
asset market indicators which allowed some policy oriented analysts to warn timely for the 
financial crisis in the U.S., while most official and academic models remained sanguine on 
economic prospects until 2007 (Bezemer, 2010). In turn, policy analysis it still too much 
grounded in theoretical macroeconomic models which omit the financial sector and asset 
markets. A paradigm change is needed, and may be underway (Bezemer, 2011; Brunnermeier 
and Sannikov 2014). This is still relevant to policy after the crisis. Private debt levels have not 
come down much since the crisis so that financial fragility is still believed to be large, as the BIS 
warns in its 2014 Annual Report (BIS, 2014:4). The overarching policy lesson is that while 
finance is not the economy, the financial sector must be included in the formulation of 
macroeconomic policies towards stable growth. 
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TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Mean Std dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
     
1955Q3-1979Q4     
     
     
Real output (RGDP) 0.0764 0.0349 0.1338 3.4540 
     
Real value of credit in 
nonfinancial sectors 
(RCR) 
0.0764 0.0309 0.6074 4.2750 
     
Real value of credit real 
estate and financial 
sectors (RCF) 
0.1059 0.0280 0.3029 2.4826 
     
Inflation (INF) 0.0007 0.0044 -0.2635 4.3228 
     
Federal funds rate (FR) 0.0878 0.4175 -0.4358 3.5891 
     
     
1984Q1-2008Q1     
     
Real output (RGDP) 0.0566 0.0273 -0.6319 3.0708 
     
Real value of credit in 
nonfinancial sectors 
(RCR) 
0.0683 0.0353 -0.2852 2.7373 
     
Real value of credit real 
estate and financial 
sectors (RCF) 
0.1011 0.0290 0.0785 2.5500 
     
Inflation (INF) -0.0002 0.0023 -0.1862 3.3362 
     
Federal funds rate (FR) -0.0330 0.3934 -0.0048 4.1800 
 
Note: RGDP and the credit variables are the annual growth rates of the logarithm of RGDP and credit stocks, respectively.  
INF and FR are the quarter-on-quarter change in INF and the log of FR, respectively. 
 
 
  
16 
 
Table 2: Granger causation tests 
 
Notes: Granger causation tests are conducted on the growth rate of the variables. Probability values of the corresponding Chi-
square statistics are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Testable Hypotheses Pre-Great Moderation  During-Great Moderation  
   
 Chi-square statistic
 
   
 1955Q3-1979Q4 1984Q1-2008Q1 
   
Real value of credit in nonfinancial 
sectors (RCR) does not Granger cause  
real output (RGDP) 
15.7741 
(0.0004) 
9.7792 
(0.0018) 
   
Real output (RGDP) does not Granger 
cause  real value of credit in 
nonfinancial sectors (RCR) 
12.0705 
(0.0024) 
0.1453 
(0.7031) 
   
Real output (RGDP) does not Granger 
cause  real value of credit real estate and 
financial sectors (RCF) 
7.0446 
(0.0295) 
0.0069 
(0.9336) 
   
Real value of credit in nonfinancial 
sectors (RCR) does not Granger cause  
real value of credit real estate and 
financial sectors (RCF) 
36.1535 
(0.0000) 
8.2267 
(0.0041) 
   
Real value of credit real estate and 
financial sectors (RCF) does not 
Granger cause  real value of credit in 
nonfinancial sectors( RCR) 
2.7934  
(0.2474) 
1.2572 
(0.2622) 
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Table 3:  Credit growth: forecast error variance decomposition 
 
% of 12-quarters-ahead forecast error variance 
of credit growth in nonfinancial sectors explained by ... 
Before the Great Moderation During the Great Moderation 
  
output growth:                                 11.5% output growth:                                    0.3% 
credit growth in FIRE sectors:         0.6% credit growth in FIRE sectors:           2.1% 
% of 12-quarters-ahead forecast error variance 
of credit growth in FIRE sectors explained by ... 
output growth:                                         5.7% output growth:                                        0.3% 
credit growth in nonfinancial sectors: 66.8% credit growth in nonfinancial  sectors: 14.7% 
credit growth in FIRE sectors:              27.5% credit growth in FIRE sectors:             85.1% 
 
 
  
 
Fig
 
ure 1: U.S. Stocks of Credit Market Instruments (% GDP) 
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Figure 2: Impulse Responses to shocks before (1955Q3-1979Q4) and during the Great Moderation 
(1984Q1-2008Q1) 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
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Figure 2 (continued) 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Notes: The impulse responses reflect response to Cholesky one standard deviation innovations±2 s.e.  
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Highlights 
 
• We conceptualize financial fragility as a changing relation of credit and output. 
• We develop three testable hypothesis on two credit aggregates and output. 
• We study financial fragility during the 1984-2007 Great Moderation in the U.S. 
• VAR estimations on 1955-2008 quarterly data are consistent with the hypotheses. 
 
